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THE CHARLESTON HOSPITAL DISPUTE:
ORGANIZING PUBLIC EMPLOYEES AND
THE RIGHT TO STRIKEt
EUGENE G. EISNER*
I. PHILIP SIPSER 4 *
INTRODUCTION
On March 20, 1969, approximately 400 nonprofessional employees
(e.g., nurses' aides and orderlies), members of Local 1199B National
Organizing Committee of Hospital & Nursing Home Employees, Re-
tail Wholesale & Department Store Union (RWDSU), AFL-CIO,1 began
picketing the Medical College of South Carolina in Charleston to pro-
test the discharge of twelve employees who had been engaged in organi-
zational activities on behalf of the Union and their fellow nonprofes-
sional employees.2 The picketing also was an attempt to inform the
public about the abominable wages and working conditions that existed
at the Hospital3 as well as to gain recognition for the Union as the
bargaining representative of the employees.
t-The authors were deeply involved in the Charleston dispute as counsel to the
National Union of Hospital and Nursing Home Employees, of which Locals 1199 and
1199B are a part.
o B.S., Cornell University School of Industrial and Labor Relations, 1956; LL.B., New
York University, 1960. Member, New York Bar; Adjunct Professor, Cornell University
School of Industrial and Labor Relations.
00 B.A., Brooklyn College, 1938; LL.B., Brookyn Law School, 1940. Member, New York
Bar; Member, American Arbitration Association Panel of Arbitrators.
1 This local union was chartered by Local 1199, Drug and Hospital Union, (RWDSU),
AFL-CIO, which represents more than 30,000 hospital workers in the metropolitan New
York area. Late in 1969, Local 1199B became one of the charter locals of a new nationwide
division of hospital and nursing home employees. This entity is known as the National
Union of Hospital and Nursing Home Employees, a division of RWDSU, AFL-CIO. For
recent commentary on the phenomenal growth and success of this new union, see Raskin,
A Union With Soul, N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 24; Kempton, Book
Review, N.Y. Rv. OF BooKs, Apr. 9, 1970, at 6.
2 The major dispute concerned hospital employees, almost all black, and almost all
female, employed by the Medical College. Although it was not widely reported at the
time, some 100 nonprofessional employees, again almost all black and female, employed
by the Charleston County Hospital, were also involved in the controversy. Although many
of the problems encountered during the protracted strike were the same in both hospitals,
that portion of this article dealing with the legal problems in the dispute in Charleston
will refer to those at the State Medical College [hereinafter the Hospital].
With regard to the "status" of the employees, it was alleged by the Hospital, although
never proved, that it was an instrumentality of the state, thereby rendering its employees
"public." For the purposes of this article, this allegation is accepted as being true.
The right-to-work statute in South Carolina did not play any significant part in the
determination of the dispute. However, South Carolina is one of the nineteen right-to-
work states. The statute and its effect upon the dispute are discussed at pp. 261-62 infra.
a For example, the overwhelming majority of the nonprofessional employees were
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The rest of the story is now history. The strike lasted for 113
turbulent days, bringing the city of Charleston to its knees as a result
of almost daily marches, rallies and boycotting of schools and down-
town merchants. The city had been under martial law, with tanks and
armed troops parading through the streets. A dusk-to-dawn curfew
was in effect throughout most of the strike, during which time nobody
was allowed on the streets. 4 At the end, however, the twelve discharged
employees were reinstated to their jobs; the minimum hiring rate was
raised to $1.60 an hour; wages for other employees were raised from
30 to 75 cents an hour; a shop committee of employees was recognized;
a formal grievance procedure was adopted and dues to the Union are
now being checked off by the Hospital on behalf of members of the
Union.5
There were many complex factors present during the struggle
which served to protract the strike. Some were political and economic
in nature (e.g., South Carolina's reputation for antiunionism, together
with the state's inducements of low wages and tax abatements to north-
ern industry); others were sociological or even racial in nature. How-
ever, despite these obvious factors, the state through its agents, including
the governor and attorney general, maintained the posture that it was
not opposed to the principle of collective bargaining, but contended
earning $1.30 an hour when the strike began. Very few, if any, of the employees had
ever received a wage increase or a promotion. There was no grievance procedure to speak
of at the Hospital, other than the administrator's "door being always open to any in-
dividual who wished to discuss a problem."
4 For a good, capsule glimpse of some of the forces involved in the historic struggle
and some of the behind-the-scenes maneuvering which led to a resolution of the strike,
see Wechsler, They Walked in the Sun, N.Y. Post, July 24, 1969, at 37.
6 In addition to the "immediate" gains, a warm and strong alliance has developed
between the Union and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. As the struggle
wore on, disparate elements in the civil rights and labor movements became united and
lined up solidly behind the Union and the strikers. Rev. Ralph David Abernathy, Presi-
dent of SCLC, who was jailed twice during the long, bitter struggle, called the outcome
a victory for the forces of "soul power and union power." Moreover, the effects of the
enormous struggle in Charleston were, no doubt, instrumental in bringing about swiftly
conducted elections at six hospitals in Baltimore, Maryland, including the giant Johns
Hopkins Medical Center, all of which the Union won. Notably, the elections were held
in Maryland in the absence of any state legislation providing for same. See Raskin, supra
note 1, at 88 n.1.
6 The Department of Health, Education and Welfare, early in June 1969, found the
Hospital to be in noncompliance with civil rights regulations that are requisite to federal
funding. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964). The Hospital was found to have discriminated
against Negroes by denying them equal education, employment and health opportunities.
The Hospital was directed to develop an affirmative program in equal employment op-
portunity or else face the loss of at least twelve million dollars in federal funds. The
Hospital, after a last minute attempt by Senator Strom Thurmond to have HEW drop
the directive, reluctantly agreed. See Wooten, U.S. Orders Carolina Hospital to Rehire 12
Negroes, N.Y. Times, June 12, 1969, at 39, col. 5.
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that it could not enter into an agreement with a union because there was
no legislation in South Carolina permitting the state, or any subdivision
thereof, to do so.7 Moreover, they argued, it was questionable whether
these employees, since they were alleged to be employed by the state,
had a right at all to join a union. Finally, they argued, public em-
ployees do not have the right to strike notwithstanding the absence of
prohibitory legislation. Thus, it was maintained throughout the "infor-
mal negotiations," that the strike was illegal and should be ended
forthwith."
The historic strike in Charleston is far from being an isolated
example of what is happening in hospitals9 and in public employment
generally today,10 or in our society as a whole for that matter. The rise
of public employee militancy must be considered in the context of the
profound economic, political and social changes which are taking place
throughout society.1 This country is engaged in a war which has
7 This is essentially the concept of sovereignty, which is discussed at pp. 261-62 infra.
8 The Hospital obtained a temporary restraining order, ex parte, from the state
court the day the picketing began, banning all picketing "at or near the Hospital." The
following day the order was amended, again ex parte, to permit ten persons to picket
"not less than twenty yards from each other." These orders remained in effect throughout
the strike. Several hundred persons were arrested and tried for contempt of the court's
order. The contempt trials proceeded after the case had been removed to the federal
court and ultimately remanded, but no decision was ever rendered by the trial court,
probably because of the infirmity of the original restraining order. See Carroll v. Princess
Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968) (holding that entry of restraining order ex parte is void).
9 Speaking of union organizing, one hospital spokesman stated that the "hospital
industry is on fire." BNA, LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK 175 (1967). In addition to the
National Union of Hospital and Nursing Home Employees, there are three other inter-
national unions that are actively organizing in the hospital industry. They are the Ameri-
can Federation of Government Employees (AFGE), American Federation of State, County
and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) and the Building Service Employees International
Union (BSEIU). For an excellent discussion and analysis of the growth of unions in the
hospital industry within the past decade, see A. SoMERS, HosPrrAL REGULATION: THE
DILEMMA OF PUBLIC POLICY ch. IV (1969).
10 From 1962-1968 the number of persons employed by federal, state and local govern-
ments has jumped from 6.5 million to 9.5 million. BNA, LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK 451
(1969). Today, one of every six persons gainfully employed is a public employee. It is
estimated that at the end of this decade, one of every four persons employed will be a
public employee. See Weisenfeld, Public Employees-lst or 2nd Class Citizens?, 16 LAB.
UJ. 685, 687 (1965).
Professor Harold Davey asserts that the seventies will be looked upon "in the year
2000 as 'The decade of the public sector,' taking its place along with the 1880's and the
1930's as one of the three most significant periods in the labor relations history of the
nation." See Davey, Resolving of Unrest in the Public Sector, 20 LAB. L.J. 529 (1969).
For good analyses of why and how public employees unionism has emerged as a
dominant force in our society, see Benodin, Cross Currents in Public Employee Bargain-
ing, in SORRY .. .No GovERmurNss TODAY 181-84 (R. Walsh ed. 1969); Wellington &
Winter, The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 78 YALE L.J. 1107
(1969).
11Professors Wellington and Winter suggest further that "just as the increase in the
size of economic units in private industry fostered unionism, so the enlarging of govern-
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seriously divided the people. Our cities are seething with racial ten-
sions. Colleges and universities, formerly secure in their "ivory towers,"
are beginning to respond to student challenges and are permitting stu-
dents to have a voice in the decision-making process that affects their
lives.
Since employment in the public sector will probably be the most
vital area of collective bargaining during the next decade and since it
must be affected by the diverse forces which are present in our con-
temporary society, this article will examine the major problems which
are confronting the public sector - first, as they existed in the Charles-
ton strike and, secondly, and perhaps more importantly, how those
problems have been treated in the past, and how they are being re-
solved in various parts of the country. Specifically, an examination will
be made of the right of public employees to join and belong to labor
unions, the right of public employees to engage in collective bargaining,
the right of public employees to strike and the effect, if any, that right-
to-work statutes have on these problems. Finally, the adoption of a
program which would enhance collective bargaining in the public
sector will be urged -a program which should vastly reduce the ten-
sions and strife that presently exist in government employment.
TIE RIGHT OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEFS TO FORM AND JoIN A UNION
Throughout the Charleston strike, informal "negotiations" were
carried on between representatives of the Hospital and the state of
South Carolina, on the one hand, and representatives of the Union
and the community, on the other.12 One of the issues raised by the
state was whether the Hospital employees involved could remain em-
ployees because they had joined a union. The state had no statute
relating to collective bargaining for public employees13 but was re-
mental bureaucracy has encouraged public employees to look to collective action for a
sense of control over their employment destiny." Wellington & Winter, supra note 10, at
1115. Frank Zeidler, former mayor of Milwaukee, suggests that the reasons may be partly
psychological. See Zeidler, Rethinking the Philosophy of Employee Relations in the
Public Service, in SORRY... No GOvEu MENT TODAY 198 (R. Walsh ed. 1969).
12 Because the Hospital steadfastly maintained its opposition to "recognizing" the
Union, the negotiations were necessarily "informal" and without prejudice to the Hospi-
tal's position. Meetings between various groups were going on all the time. On occasion,
individuals in the community purporting to be speaking "for the power structure" would
seek out representatives of the Union or the SCLC (which was heavily involved in all
the negotiations) in an attempt to work out a feasible settlement. Ultimately, however,
it was around-the-clock, face-to-face meetings between representatives of the Hospital and
of the Union which resulted in the final settlement.
18 South Carolina, of course, has a right-to-work law which dearly states: "It is
hereby declared to be the public policy of this State that the right of persons to work
shall not be denied or abridged on account of membership or non-membership in any
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lying on an opinion rendered by its attorney general in 1954,14 which
held that a local school board could pass a regulation which would
permit it to refuse employment to a teacher because of membership in
a labor union.
Fortunately, three cases had been decided recently which affirmed
the constitutional right of public employees to join a labor union.
Despite such authority, however, the state steadfastly maintained its
position and actually threatened to discharge all employees who had
joined the union. Because of their obvious importance to the subject
matter at hand, a consideration of those cases and other recent develop-
ments follows.
The McLaughlin, Woodward and Atkins Cases
McLaughlin v. Tilendis15 arose in Illinois after a local school
board had dismissed one non-tenured teacher and had refused to hire
another non-tenured teacher because of their membership in a union.
The teachers sought an injunction in federal district court to prevent
the school district from discriminating against teachers who engage in
these activities. The court dismissed the case on the ground that the
plaintiffs had no constitutional right to join a union. The Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the first amend-
ment does confer upon individuals the right to form and join a labor
union, and that the complaint, which alleged a violation of plaintiffs'
rights under the Civil Rights Act of 1871,16 does state a claim for relief.
Furthermore, the court held that the supremacy clause of the Constitu-
tion 17 forbids the state from interposing the Illinois Tort Immunity
Act' as a defense to a cause of action based on a federal statute.
In AFSCME v. Woodward,19 a group of North Platte, Nebraska
labor union or labor organization." S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 40-46, 40-46.8 (1962) (emphasis
added). The attorney general's response to his state's own law protecting the right of all
employees to work regardless of membership or nonmembership in a labor union was
simply, "[t]he law doesn't apply to public employees."
14 OP. ATr'Y GEN. No. 1778 (Dec. 23, 1964).
15 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968).
16 17 Stat. 13 (1871), as amended, 42 US.C. § 1983 (1964), which provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
17 U.S. CONST. art. VI, d. 2.
18 ILL. REV. STAT. cl. 85 (1967).
19 406 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1969).
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municipal street department employees brought an action in federal
court, again under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, seeking damages and
injunctive relief against the city commissioner, who allegedly dis-
charged them for having joined a union. The court dismissed the
action. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed, citing McLaughlin as
well as Thomas v. Collins.20 In support of its conclusion, the court
recited a long line of cases in which it had been held that the freedom
to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an
inseparable aspect of liberty assured by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.21
At first blush, Atkins v. Charlotte22 appears to be a great victory
for public employees everywhere. A three-judge district court did strike
down as unconstitutional a section of a North Carolina statute which
prohibited public employees, in this case firefighters, from joining
unions.23 Characterizing the section as "unnecessary to the protection
of valid state interests," 24 the court based its conclusion on the au-
thority of United States v. Robel25 and other cases contained therein.
However, the court went further and found a related section of the
act,26 which provides that "contracts between units of government and
labor unions... concerning public employees are ... illegal," as pro-
tective of a "valid state interest" and upheld its constitutionality. The
court apparently inferred from a legitimate state interest, i.e., the pro-
tection of property and life from destruction by fire, that collective
bargaining by the city of Charlotte with a union of firefighters neces-
sarily destroys that protection. The fallacy of the court's reasoning is
patently obvious.
20 323 U.S. 516 (1945). In this case, the Supreme Court struck down a Texas statute
which required union organizers to register with the state and obtain an official card be-
fore soliciting for membership. In so doing, the Court reminded the states that they may
not infringe upon the constitutional right of a union organizer to publicly advocate self-
organization and collective bargaining. 323 U.S. at 533. For a related "freedom of asso-
ciation" case in the civil rights arena, see NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S.
449 (1958).
21 See 406 F.2d at 139; see also United States v. Robel, 389 US. 258 (1967), wherein
Mr. Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the Court, stated that "our decisions leave little
doubt that the right of association is specifically protected by the First Amendment." Id.
at 263 n.7.
22 296 F. Supp. 1068 (D.N.C. 1969).
23 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-97 (1963). Alabama, Georgia and Virginia have similar statutes.
See ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 391 (1958); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-909 & 54-9923 (1953); VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 40-65 (1950) & 40-64.2 (1970). In light of these recent decisions, it is likely that
they will fall when attacked in the courts.
24 296 F. Supp. at 1071.
25 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
26 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-9M (1963).
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Other Recent Developments
In addition to recent cases which uphold the right of public em-
ployees to join a union and to seek monetary damages as well as in-
junctive relief under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 for any interference
with that right,27 there has been a discernible trend toward judicial
recognition that first amendment rights of public employees extend
beyond the naked right to join a union.28 For example, in State ex Tel.
Missey v. Cabool,29 the Supreme Court of Missouri held that not only
were public employees entitled to reinstatement for having been dis-
charged because of union activities, but also that they have a constitu-
tional right to meet and confer with city officials about labor relations
issues. Likewise, in Indianapolis Education Association v. Lewallen,30
a federal district court found a duty on the part of a city school board
to bargain with teacher representatives even in the absence of enabling
legislation.
More recently, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
declared a section of the Chicago Police Department rules unconstitu-
tional because it prohibited policemen from criticizing their superiors.
The Police Department had argued that the rules were necessary be-
cause a police force is quasi-military in nature and depends upon rigid
internal discipline for successful performance. The court was not
impressed with this argument.31
In light of the decisions in McLaughlin, Woodward and Atkins,
as well as the Supreme Court's language in Robel, there should no
longer be a question as to the public employee's constitutional right
to join a labor union. Consequently, any state statute which mandates
the contrary should be struck down by the courts. The old concept that
"public employment is a privilege and not a right" is all but dead.
Once having established that right, however, the correlative right of
collective bargaining for public employees, which is the next step, must
be, but as yet has not been, firmly established.
27 See, e.g., Service Employees Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Butler, 306 F. Supp. 1080
(W.D. Pa. 1969).
28 It has been argued that we are nearing the time when men in the military will be
granted the right to belong to a union and have the right of collective bargaining. See
Sullivan, Soldiers in Unions -Protected First Amendment Right?, 20 LAB. L.J. 581 (1969);
see also K. HANSLOWE, THE EMERGING LAw OF LABOR RELATIONS IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
116-17 (1967).
29441 S.W.2d 85 (Mo. 1969).
30 71 L.R.R.M. 2898 (S.D. Ind. 1969). See pp. 262-66 infra for a full discussion of public
employee bargaining, with or without enabling legislation.
31 Muller v. Conlisk, 429 F.2d 901 (7th Cit. 1970).
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COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
The Concept of Sovereignty
As indicated earlier, South Carolina has no legislation which
either permits or forbids collective bargaining by public employees.
Nevertheless, it was argued that it would be illegal for the state to
enter into a collective bargaining agreement (no less collective bar-
gaining) with a union because without legislation it does not possess
the authority to do so.
The state was relying on the ancient concept of "sovereignty."
Although lexicographers have defined sovereignty as "the supreme, ab-
solute, and uncontrollable power by which any independent state is
governed" or the "supreme political authority, 3 2 Professor Hanslowe
says that
[w]hat this position comes down to is that governmental power in-
cludes the power, through law, to fix the terms and conditions of
government employment, that this power cannot be given or taken
away or shared and that any organized effort to interfere with this
power through a process such as collective bargaining is irreconcil-
able with the idea of sovereignty and is hence unlawful.33
Of course, in modern times, "the concept has been widely modified, if
not wholly abandoned."34 As others have suggested, "the [sovereignty]
doctrine does not preclude the enactment of legislation specifically
authorizing the government to enter into collective-bargaining rela-
tionships with its employees. '35
Today, there are more than thirty states which have enacted
legislation permitting, in some cases, all its public employees the right
to engage in collective bargaining, while others have laws which have
granted the right to limited groups such as teachers, municipal em-
ployees or firefighters. 3 As a matter of fact, even South Carolina
enacted a law several years ago which extended collective bargaining
rights to one particular group of public employees.37 Moreover, it was
32 BLACK's LAw DIcIONARY 1568 (4th rev. ed. 1968).
33 K. HANSLOWE, supra note 28, at 14-15.
34 Id. In the words of former Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz, "[the] doctrine is wrong
in theory; what's more, it won't work." See Stieber, A New Approach to Strikes in Public
Employment, in SoRRY... No GOvEUbMENT TODAY 242, 246-47 (R. Valsh ed. 1969).
35 W. HART, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE FEDERAL CIvIL SERVICE 44 (1961).
86 For a discussion of state laws which grant collective bargaining rights to public
employees, see notes 47-61 and accompanying text infra.
37 S.C. CODE ANN. § 54-21 (1962). This section grants the right to employees of the
state's Ports Authority. It could be argued that a legislative enactment on behalf of some
public employees and not others denies the omitted employees equal protection of the
1970]
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argued in the Charleston dispute that it was the declared public policy
of the state to prohibit denial of the right of any worker to choose a
bargaining agent.38 Since this policy is not specifically limited to em-
ployees in private industry, state and local officials necessarily have the
authority to meet with representatives of such employees who join a
union for the purpose of discussing wages, hours and working condi-
tions.3 9
In the face of this persuasive evidence, the attorney general never-
theless asserted that the remedy lies with the state legislature. He
maintained the position that in the absence of enabling legislation,
the state is powerless to enter into an agreement with a union.
Absence of Legislation-A Bar to Collective Bargaining for Public
Employees?
The modern view has rejected this concept. The startling upsurge
and development of public employee collective bargaining in recent
years has not awaited the passage of enabling legislation. Municipal
and state attorneys have been required to find ways to justify collective
bargaining in the absence of express authorization.40
For example, the Attorney General of Idaho concluded that mu-
nicipalities have the power to enter into collective bargaining agree-
ments if they so desire and if no local ordinance forbids it. The opinion
was based on a section of the Idaho Code which gives municipalities
the power to "contract and be contracted with." 41 Similarly, the Ari-
zona Board of Education agreed to engage in collective bargaining
law in violation of the fourteenth amendment. It is conceivable that the courts will adopt
this approach in the future.
38 S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-46 (1962) (the right-to-work law).
89 This position has been adopted by the Attorney General of Indiana, another right-
to-work state. See Op. Arr'Y GEN. No. 22 (Oct. 6, 1966), reported in R. RUBIN, A SUM-
MARY OF STATE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING LAw IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 17 (1968). See also
Potts v. Hal, 229 Ark. 830, 318 S.W.2d 826 (1958); Transit Local 1338 v. Dallas Pub.
Transit Bd., 430 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); Beverly v. Dallas, 292 S.W.2d 172
(rex. Civ. App. 1956); wherein courts of Arkansas and Texas held that their respective
right-to-work laws apply to public employees.
The legislatures of nineteen states have, in their wisdom, enacted right-to-work laws.
See 4 BNA STATE LAB. LAws (1969).
40 The explosion in public employee bargaining within the last few years has caught
several institutions off guard. For example, a Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor
Statistics reported that it was "planning" to do a study of collective bargaining agreements
covering all public employees. Moore, Long-Range Program Objectives for BLS, 92
MoNmLY LAB. REv., Oct. 1969, at 4. The Bureau has recently indicated that it is "nowhere
near a completion of that study." Meanwhile, public employee organization continues to
grow at the rate of 1,000 new members per day. See Anderson, Recent Developments
Involving Public Employee Organization and Bargaining, in PUBLIC EMPLOYEE ORGANIZA-
TION AND BARGAINING 19 (BNA ed. 1968).
41 The opinion, issued in 1959, is reported in R. RUBIN, supra note 39, at 17.
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with a union that was selected by a majority of the teachers, despite
the fact that Arizona did not have an enabling statute, although it had
a right-to-work statute.42 It is likewise a notorious fact that cities such
as Philadelphia, Toledo, and Dayton have engaged in full-scale bar-
gaining with unions for years in the absence of legislation.43 Finally,
it was only after a bitter struggle over the right of recognition of
sanitation workers, culminating with the death of Rev. Martin Luther
King, that de facto bargaining was accomplished in Memphis, Tennes-
see.
44
In addition to the opinion of attorneys general and the sheer
necessity of "dealing with unions" by governments because of emer-
gency situations, like those in Memphis and Charleston, or because of
economic power, a number of courts have likewise concluded that any
governmental body has the implied authority to enter into collective
bargaining with its employees in the absence of express legislative
authority.45
It would appear, therefore, that the conventional opinion, adhering
to the view that unless the public employer is expressly authorized to
recognize and bargain collectively with unions it cannot be required to
do so, is on the wane. In those instances where state and local govern-
ments fail to enact legislation to extend collective bargaining to their
public employees in the future, it can only be hoped that the modern
view will prevail. Moreover, it would seem that such interpretations
will soon become less imperative as increasing numbers of state and
local bodies enact collective bargaining statutes for public employees.
Laws Governing Collective Bargaining by Public Employees
Section 2 (2) of the National Labor Relations Act states that "the
term 'employees' [does]*not include any State or political subdivision
thereof."46 Thus, even though his counterpart in private industry has
42 BNA Gov'T EMPL RE. R P. No. 231, at B-8 (1968).
43 See Wasserman, Resolving of Unrest in the Public Sector, 20 LAB. L.J. 553, 556(1969). Mr. Wasserman, an official of AFSCME, notes further that the "history, develop-
ment and growth of [the] union is predicated on de facto bargaining; that is, bargaining
without the benefit of law." Id. at 557.44 Apparently Memphis has not learned its lesson well. Even today, the city refuses
to recognize or bargain with representatives of its police and fire services. See BNA
Gov'T EMPL R.L. REP. No. 248, at B-9 (1968).
45 See, e.g., Indianapolis Educ. Ass'n v. Lewallen, 71 L.R.R.M. 2898 (S.D. Ind. 1969);
Norwalk Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951); Illinois
Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 76 Ill. App. 2d 456, 222 N.E.2d 243 (1966); Louisville Fire
Fighters v. Burke, BNA Gov~r EMPL. REL. R P. No. 357, at B-12 (Ky. Cir. Ct. 1970);
IBEW v. Farmington, 75 N.M. 393, 405 P.2d 233 (1965); Civil Serv. Forum v. N.Y.C.
Transit Authority, 3 Misc. 2d 346, 151 N.Y.S.2d 402 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1956).
46 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1964).
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enjoyed the protection of the Act since its passage in 1935, the right
of the public employee to enjoy the fruits of collective bargaining has
been left to the whim and caprice of the states and municipalities. The
first state to enact comprehensive legislation for employees in the
public sector was Wisconsin, and that was not accomplished until
1959.47 The "enlightened" state of New York did not enact its Taylor
Law until 1967.48 More depressing is the fact that even today only
nineteen states have comprehensive collective bargaining laws defining
public employment labor relations.49 Twenty-one other states have
granted the right to some employees at the local level to organize and
bargain collectively. 50
A cursory examination of the various state laws reveals immedi-
ately a wide variety of dealings with public employees. Some states
allow their employees to organize and deal collectively with the state,
while forbidding employees of local jurisdictions the same rights. Other
states allow local employees the right to organize and bargain but
forbid the same right to state employees. Some laws extend only to
certain groups of employees such as teachers, firefighters or nurses.
Others simply make it lawful for public officials to "meet and confer"
with employee representatives.
Arvid Anderson, Chairman of the Office of Collective Bargaining
in New York City and former Chairman of the Wisconsin Employee Re-
lations Board, warns that unless the states move swiftly to enact legisla-
tion that provides orderly procedures to deal with the causes of public
employee unrest, the federal government most likely will.51 Mr. Ander-
47 See R. RUmN, supra note 39, at 48; see also McKelvey, Fact-Finding: Promise or
Illusion?, 22 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 528, 531 (1969). The original Wisconsin law covered
only municipal employees. Wis. STAT. § 111.70 (1959). The act was not amended to cover
state employees until 1967.
48 N.Y. Civ. SERv. L. §§ 200-12 (McKinney supp. 1970). Until the passage of this law,
all public employees in New York State had no effective means of enjoying collective bar-
gaining because the state's labor relations act was expressly inapplicable to governmental
employees. See N.Y. LAB. L. § 715 (McKinney 1963). It is interesting to note, however, that
Mayor Wagner, in the late fifties, established by executive order one of the first codes of
labor relations, in this instance for employees of the city of New York. See Walsh,
Background, in SORRY . . . No GovEm- MENrr TODAY 154, 155 (R. Walsh ed. 1969).
49 See ABA Comm. on State Labor Law, BNA Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. RF-5, at
61-201 (1970).
50 See Walsh, supra note 48, at 154. For a complete analysis of all the state statutes,
see M. Mosiow, CoLLwrsvE BARGAINING IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 72-79 (1970); Goldberg,
Labor-Management Relations Laws in Public Service, MONTHLY LAB. REv., June 1968,
at 48. For the full text of each statute, see BNA Gov'r EripL. REL. RP. RF-2, at 51-1011.
51 Address by Arvid Anderson, Symposium on Labor-Management Relations in the
Public Sector, the University of Kentucky Labor Education Center, Nov. 14, 1969. On
April 30, 1970, Congressman Gilbert of New York introduced a bill, entitled "A National
Public Employees Relations Act," to fill the void left by the states. H.R. 17383, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1970).
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son argues that, since the Supreme Court in Maryland V. Wirtz 2 has
reaffirmed broad federal authority under the commerce clause 3 to
regulate conditions of employment for state and local schools by
bringing them under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 4 all that would
be required to extend the principles of the Taft-Hartley law0 to state
and local employees would be for Congress to delete the exemption for
state and local political subdivisions.
The major federal "legislation" in the area of collective bargaining
for United States Government employees is Executive Order No.
11491.6 Although the order grants the right of collective bargaining
to "employee organizations of their own choice" (not called "unions"),
employees have discovered that the executive branch retains the right
to determine which issues are bargainable. The executive order is not,
by any means, the "Magna Carta" for federal employees in the sense
that the Wagner Act 57 was for employees in the private sector. The
recent postal workers' strike certainly attests to this proposition. How-
ever, in the wake of that strike, Congress enacted the Postal Reorgani-
zation Act, 8 which establishes the United States Postal Service as an
independent government agency and is expected to usher in a new era
of collective bargaining for some employees in the federal sector.
The outlook in other arenas is also encouraging. Various gover-
nor's commissions have been created within the past few years to rec-
ommend and, in some cases, revise public employee laws.09 A recent
survey reveals that, in the year 1969 alone, nine states enacted legislation
granting broad collective bargaining rights to various groups of public
employees. 0 In 1970, Hawaii and Pennsylvania enacted the first com-
52892 U.S. 183 (1968).
53 U.S. CONs. art. I, § 8.
54 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1964).
55 Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), amended and codified, 29
U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (1964).
506 34 Fed. Reg. 17605 (1970). This recent order replaced Executive Order No. 10988,
27 Fed Reg. 551 (1962), promulgated by President Kennedy. The improvements over its
predecessor have been described as "insignificant." See Address by Plato E. Papps, in
BNA Gov'r EMPL. R.EL. RaP. No. 367, at A-8 (1970).
57 National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), amended and codified, 29 U.S.C.
§ 151 et seq. (1964).
5839 C.F.R. § 111 et seq. (1970).
59 See, e.g., Maryland Study Commission, BNA Gov'T Esn'L. REL. REP. No. 278, at
AA-1 (1969); Connecticut Commission, BNA Gov'r EMPL. REL. REP. No. 81, at D-5
(1965); Pennsylvania Commission, BNA Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. No. 251, at E-1 (1968).
60 Mitchell 9: Sorenson, State Labor Legislation Enacted in 1969, MONTHLY LAB. R-.,
Jan. 1970, at 48, 51-52. Four of the nine states, Nebraska, South Dakota, New Hampshire and
Nevada, enacted public employment legislation for the first time in 1969; whereas Maine,
Oregon, Michigan, Vermont, and Washington substantially broadened their coverage last
year.
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prehensive laws granting the right to strike for all public employees,
except where such strike would endanger public health and safety."'
However, with the exception of these few states, public employees do
not have the right to strike. The question is: in the light of past experi-
ence, does this constitute sound labor relations policy?
SMIKES BY EMPLOYEES IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
The Effectiveness of "No Strike" Legislation
Although our national labor policy, as set forth in the National
Labor Relations Act6 2 and the Norris-LaGuardia Act,68 considers the
right to strike as a fundamental proposition for employees in private
employment, there is something sacrosanct about public employment
which makes strikes against the government a cardinal sin.
New York's Taylor Law is typical of state statutes as they relate
to the issue of the right to strike. The applicable section of this law
provides that "[n]o public employee or employee organization shall
engage in a strike, and no public employee or employee organization
shall cause, instigate, encourage or condone a strike."6 4 At the federal
level, strikes by employees of the United States are strictly prohibited
on the theory that any such strike would endanger the nation's health
and security. 5 Moreover, until recently, the mere "assertion" of the
right to strike by a federal employee carried with it certain criminal
sanctions.66
The Taylor Law67 has not been very successful in preventing
strikes. Ten days after the law took effect, New York City teachers
went on strike. Since that time the teachers have gone out again and
so have the city's sanitation workers. The recent strike by federal
postal workers to win long-overdue wage increases is an indication that
61 Hawaii Act 171, L 1970 (effective July 1, 1970); Pa. S.B. 1333, L. 1970 (effective
Oct. 21, 1970).
Additionally, Vermont permits strikes by municipal employees so long as they
do not endanger the health, safety and welfare of the public. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 1704 (Supp. 1969). Montana also prohibits strikes in private or public hospitals only
if there is another strike at a hospital within a radius of 150 miles. MONT. Rzv. CODES
ANN. tit. 41, § 2209 (Supp. 1969).
62 49 Stat. 449 (1985), amended and codified, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1964).
6347 Stat. 70 (1932), amended and codified, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1964). This act is
also referred to as the Federal Anti-Injunction Act.
64 N.Y. Civ. SERv. L. § 210 (McKinney supp. 1970).
65 See Taft-Hartley Act § 305, 61 Stat. 160 (1947); cf. 5 U.S.C. § 7311 (Supp. IV 1969).
66 A three-judge panel of a federal district court declared that portion of the statute
which prohibited the "assertion" of the right to strike by any federal employee to be in
violation of the first amendment. See National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Blount, 305
F. Supp. 546 (D.D.C. 1969). The Government recently withdrew its petition for certiorari.
See BNA GovTr EMexL. REL. RE-P. No. 365, A-10 (1970).
67 In 1967, this legislation replaced the unworkable Condon-Wadlin Act, 1958 N.Y.
Sess. Laws, ch. 790, because of the stringency of the latter's penalties.
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employees of the federal government can no longer be counted upon
to sit idly by while their brethren in state and local government, not
to mention private industry, continue to make substantial gains by
striking. Recent studies prove that the frequency and duration of
strikes by public employees have increased.68 In short, when employees
are convinced that they are receiving unfair treatment they will strike,
regardless of permissive or prohibitory legislation.6 9
The public employee unions are beginning to revise former policy
positions and are now asserting the right to strike. For example, in
1966 the International Executive Board of AFSCME adopted this posi-
tion:
AFSCME insists upon the right of public employees.., to strike.
To forestall this right is to handicap the free collective bargaining
process. Whenever legal barriers to the exercise of this right exist,
it shall be our policy to seek the removal of such barriers. Where
one party at the bargaining table possesses all the power and au-
thority, the bargaining becomes no more than formalized petition-
ing.70
In 1967, the essentially conservative New York Civil Service Employees
Association rescinded their nineteen year no-strike pledge.71 Likewise,
the American Federation of Government Employees, the Firefighters,
the Postal Workers Unions, and such "professional" employee organi-
zations as the National Education Association 72 and the American
Nurse's Association 73 have followed this path.
Leading Authorities and Officials Support Public Employee Right to
Strike
The trend toward permissibility of strikes by public employees
is by no means restricted to public employee unions. The leading
authority who asserts this position is Theodore Kheel, noted mediator
68 See BLS BULL., WoRK STOPPAGES IN GOVERNmENT, 1958-1967 (1968) (Table 1); see also
WORK STOPPAGES IN GOVERNmENT, 1958-1969, CONG. QUARTERLY 843-44 (1970). According
to these studies, the number of strikes each year by public employees has substantially
increased over those of the previous year and the number of persons involved each year
has dramatically risen.
69 In those states in which local governments are required to recognize and bargain
with unions, recognitional strikes have virtually been eliminated. On the other hand,
it has been argued that those states which require only that employers "meet and
confer" with the union, have perhaps aggravated the strike problem. See Burton &
Krider, The Role and Consequences of Strikes by Public Employees, 79 YALE LJ. 418,
439 (1970).
70 Policy Statement on Public Employee Unions; Rights and Responsibilities, Adopted
by International Executive Board of AFSCME, AFL.CIO, July 26, 1966, in Soaer . .
No GovERNmENr TODAY 67-68 (R. Walsh ed. 1969).
71 See A. THoMPsON, STRIKES AND STRIKE PENALTIES IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 9 (1967).
72 Id. at 9-10.
78 A. SomERs, supra note 9, at 62.
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and labor attorney. At a labor conference concerning public employ-
ment last year, Mr. Kheel stated that "[t]he most effective technique
to produce acceptable terms to resolve disputes in voluntary agree-
ments between groups is collective bargaining even though it involves
conflict and the possibility of work disruption. There is no alterna-
tive.",74
Donald H. Wollett, former counsel to the National Education
Association, wrote in 1964, that "strikes are impermissible in any gov-
ernmental bargaining system."75 In 1968, he admitted that "[e]xperi-
ence has taught me that I was wrong. It is no longer clear to me
why the legality of a strike by bus drivers, for instance, should depend
on whether their employer is a municipal corporation or a privately
owned company." 70
Representative of this philosophy in the academic community
are the following remarks of Professor Clyde Summers:
No democratic society has been successful in preventing strikes by
public employees. We're going to have them or we're going to be
involved in different kinds of economic conflict that will be more
difficult to handle.... We can bear wide ranges of economic con-
flict without collapsing, and we must learn to use these situations
in a constructive fashion when they arise.77
Sterling Spero, one of the forerunners of the contemporary views
of public employee unions, prophesied more than twenty years ago that
[w]hen the state denies its own employees the right to strike merely
because they are its employees, it defines ordinary labor disputes as
attacks upon public authority and makes the use of drastic reme-
dies, and even armed forces the only method for handling what
otherwise might be simple employment relations.78
Raymond Male, Commissioner of Labor and Industry, New Jersey,
speaking on behalf of public employees' right to strike, noted that "it
74 Kheel, Strikes and Public Employment, 67 MICH. L. REv. 931, 942 (1969). Mr. Kheel
goes on to suggest that where a "bona fide emergency" exists and there is a threat to
the health and safety of the community, then perhaps a cooling-off period similar to that
provided for under Taft-Hartley might be invoked.
75Wollett, The Public Employee at the Bargaining Table: Promise or Illusion?,
15 LAB. LJ. 8, 12 (1964).
76 Wollett, The Taylor Law and the Strike Ban, in PUBLIC EMPLOYEE ORGANIZATION
AND BARGAINING 35 (BNA ed. 1968). Similarly, it may be argued that nurses in private
hospitals are as essential to the health of their patients as nurses in public hospitals.
The same thing is true for employees of public utilities. They are perhaps even more
"essential" than their brethren in public employment.
77 Address by Professor Clyde Summers, Sixth Annual Midwest Labor Law Conference,
Columbus, Ohio, Oct. 3, 1969.
78 S. SP'Ro, THE GovERNmrErN As EMPLOYER 16 (1948) (emphasis added).
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may be more critical to have the weapon available to workers to alert
management, government, the customers of the government, and the
public that they must do something; they cannot go on ignoring the
problem." 79 James C. O'Brien, Personnel Director of the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare has predicted the possibility of offi-
cial approval of federal employee strikes "especially in situations not
too closely tied to the national welfare."80 United States Civil Service
Commissioner Robert E. Hampton recently told the Convention of
the National Association of Internal Revenue Employees that the
"Commission soon will review the law prohibiting strikes by federal
employees to determine whether the provisions are relevant to the
times in light of the postal and air traffic controllers strikes earlier
this year.""'
The last word on this subject was perhaps uttered by Arvid Ander-
son a few years ago at the Twenty-First Annual Conference on Labor
at New York University:
I am convinced that those who seek the resolution of all public em-
ployee disputes or critical private sector disputes with guarantees
against a strike under any conditions are seeking an illusion in a
free society. The only absolute guarantee against strikes in public
employment or in critical private services is a police state.82
Progress at the State Level
Four states have already codified the right of public employees
to strike, absent certain emergency conditions.8 3 In addition, the legis-
lature of the state of Maryland"4 is studying a proposal by a task force
79 Male, Labor Crises and the Role of Management, in DEVELOPMENTS IN PUBLIC
EMPLOYEE RELATIONS 104, 109 (1965). In other words, by giving government employees a
false sense of security, the strike prohibition very often provokes the very result it seeks
to prevent. See, e.g., School Dist. v. Holland Educ. Ass'n, 380 Mich. 314, 157 NA.2d 206
(1968), wherein the Supreme Court of Michigan denied an injunction against a teacher's
strike, questioning the school district's "good faith" during the negotiations.
80 See A. THOMPSON, supra note 71, at 10. Professor Jean McKelvey shares Mr.
O'Brien's views and predicted more than a year ago that the states would soon legalize
strikes by public employees. See McKelvey, supra note 47, at 543. Moreover, if the federal
and state governments fail to provide this right to public employees it would seem that,
here too, public employees are being denied equal protection of the law. See note 37
supra; see also Anderson Fed. of Teachers v. School City, - Ind. -, -, 251 N.E.2d
15, 18 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
81 Address by Robert E. Hampton, National Ass'n of Internal Revenue Employees
Convention, Buffalo, New York, Sept. 4, 1970.
82 PROCEEDINGS OF N.Y.U. 21sr ANN. CONF. ON LABOR 460 (T. Christenson ed. 1969).
Moreover, as has been pointed out by Allan Weisenfeld in reference to the 1969 steel-
workers' strike in Bilbao, Spain, "even in totalitarian societies where all strikes are legally
prohibited, strikes nevertheless occur." Weisenfeld, Public Employees Are Still Second
Class Citizens, 20 LAB. L.J. 138, 139 (1969).
83 See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
84 Maryland Study Commission, BNA GOv'T EmPL. REL.. REP. No. 278, at AA-1 (1969).
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which has recommended that strikes by public employees be permitted
except "where the health and safety of the general public is endan-
gered."
In 1969, the Labor Law Committee of the Ohio State Bar As-
sociation recommended repeal of the Ferguson Act85 which prohibits
strikes by public employees.8 6 It recommended that certified unions
be given the right to strike in nonessential occupations.8 7 Additionally,
Connecticut,88 Michigan 9 and New Jersey" are studying recommenda-
tions by their respective state commissions which revise present public
employment laws; these recommendations are silent on the banning
of strikes.
It is desirable and probable that this "softening" trend by the
states will continue and accelerate over the next few years. It is not
inconceivable that by the end of this decade almost all public em-
ployees will enjoy the right to strike except where the public health
and welfare would be endangered.
The Canadian Experience
In 1967, the Dominion of Canada enacted labor legislation on
behalf of all of its federal employees.91 This legislation may very well
prove to be a model for this country's future labor relations with its
government employees. The Act covers more than 200,000 employees,
from scientists to general laborers, exempting only the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police. It is administered by a tripartite board composed of
government, labor and neutral members. The provisions with respect
to impasse procedures are most unusual. Prior to the commencement
of bargaining the bargaining agent has an option: it may decide either
to refer all contract disputes to binding arbitration or it may choose to
submit to a conciliation procedure with the ultimate right to strike.
The right to strike is inhibited only slightly by considerations of
national safety or security.
85 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4117.01-4117.04 (Baldwin 1969).
86 See Burton & Krider, supra note 69, at 437.
87 Professors Burton and Krider suggest that the governmental services can be divided
into these categories:
(1) essential services- police and fire - where strikes immediately endanger public
health and safety; (2) intermediate services - sanitation, hospitals, transit, water,
and sewage- where strikes of a few days might be tolerated; (8) non-essential
services - streets, parks, education, housing, welfare and administration - where
strikes of indefinite duration could be tolerated.
Id. at 427.
88 Connecticut Commission, BNA Gov'r EssPL. REL. REP. No. 81, at D-5 (1965).
89 Michigan Commission, BNA Gov'r EMPL. REL. REP. No. 181, at F-2 (1967).
90 New Jersey Commission, BNA Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. No. 229, at D-6 (1968).
91 Public Service Staff Relations Act, Can. Stat., ch. 72 (1967).
[VoL. 45:254
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RIGHT TO STRIKE
Thus far, the Act has worked quite well. Very few unions have
in fact opted for the right to strike.92 A national postal union, however,
did exercise the strike option a few years ago. After conciliation efforts
failed to bring the parties together, 25,000 federal postal workers struck
the nation for twenty-two days. Although the public was terribly in-
convenienced during this period, no state of emergency was declared,
nor were the Royal Mounted Police called in to break the strike. On
the contrary, a special mediator was appointed by the tripartite board,
and he helped the union and the government reach a voluntary agree-
ment.9
3
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
With the exception of the Southern states, there is an indisputable
trend in this country toward recognition of the right of public em-
ployees to deal with their employers through representatives of their
own choosing. However, many states which have chosen to enact such
legislation provided inadequate machinery for true collective bargain-
ing.
There is no substitute for meaningful collective bargaining. The
double standard in our national labor policy, as it relates to the private
sector and the public sector, should be eliminated. Accordingly, the
policy of our Government, which encourages "the practice and pro-
cedure of collective bargaining and ... the exercise . . .of full free-
dom of association, self-organization, and designation of represen-
tatives .. . for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions
of... employment," 94 must be made applicable to public employees.
The National Labor Relations Act can be simply amended so that
"employees of any State or political subdivision thereof" will no longer
be exempt from the Act.
As an alternative, it is suggested that the federal government take
a long, hard, serious look at the public employee legislation enacted
by the Canadian government. Bargaining to finality in the public
sector in Canada has proved to be not only desirable but also work-
able. It can work here too.
Finally, it is probable that the issue of the right to strike for
public employees will recede into the background and become inciden-
tal to the bargaining process once sanctions designed to prevent them
are removed. As some have predicted,
92 See Arthurs, Collective Bargaining in the Public Service of Canada, 67 MAim. L.
Ray. 971 (1969).
93 Id. at 992-93.
-94 National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 US.C. § 151 (1964).
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[s]trikes in the public sector will be no more frequent, probably
less, than in the private sector and cause no greater inconvenience
and dislocation. . . . It is the denial of the right to strike in the
public sector... which invites strike threats. Anti-strike laws create
a tendency on the part of public managers to rely on them to bail
them out, and hence, they tend to contribute little to help solve
the problems before the bargainers.9 5
However, until such time as this basic right is uniformly accepted, it
is recommended that the states follow the approach recently adopted
by Hawaii and Pennsylvania, i.e., permit strikes by all public employees
except where such a strike immediately endangers public health and
safety.96
We must accept the fact, and accept it now, that strikes will
not be eliminated in a free society. Once our governments realize
this basic fact of economic life, we can begin to make collective bar-
gaining work in the public sector. Time and energy devoted to the
prevention of strikes by public employees is time and energy we can
ill afford to spend. Improving the procedures and practice of collective
bargaining for public employees across the country is a wiser invest-
ment in the future.
95 Weisenfeld, supra note 82, at 143-44.
96 The National Committee for Equal Justice for Public Employees has just been
established to coordinate a drive in the states to enact legislation permitting strikes by
public employees except where the public health and safety is involved. Former Attorney
General Ramsey Clark is the chairman of the Committee. See BNA Gov'T EMPL. REL.
REP. No. 363, at B-8 (1970).
